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In 1964 the Yale Law Journal published a bibliography of Professor
Arthur Corbin's publications.' The bibliography quotes a letter from Arthur
Corbin to a Yale Law Journal editor2 in which Corbin states that he had
written a "'one man revision' of the first Restatement of Contracts, which
he sent in hand-written form to Judge Herbert Goodrich, then Director of
the American Law Institute. Corbin said that Judge Goodrich "had each
such installment typewritten and multigraphed for the use by the revision
reporter and his committee and perhaps by others." 3 Diligent search by law
librarians has failed to locate a copy of this revision of the Restatement by
Corbin in any law library. The search for such a copy led me to the
* Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law, Fordham University; Scholar in Residence,
Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Friedrich Kessler and Eugene Rostow,
Sterling Professors Emeriti of Yale University for their permission, in their capacities as literary
editors of Arthur L. Corbin's writings, to publish these letters. I am also grateful to the
Harvard Law School Library for its permission, in the capacity of custodian of the Braucher
papers, for the publication of these letters.
1. Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74 YALE L.J. 311
(1964) [hereinafter Bibliography].
2. Michael A. Varet, now a member of Varet, Marcus & Fink in New York City. Mr.
Varet confirms receipt of the letter and still possesses it. Letter of Michael A. Varet to the
author (Sept. 23, 1992) (on file with author).
3. Bibliography, supra note 1, at 322-23 n.22. The quotation in full, as edited in the
bibliography, is as follows:
Is it possible at this point to include a statement as to [the] Revision of the Contracts
Restatement, now being prepared ... by Professor Braucher as Reporter and a
Committee of Advisers? I was asked by the Council of the A.L. Institute through
its Director [the late] Judge Herbert Goodrich, to go through the Restatement I and
indicate the sections in need of revision. This was about 5 years ago. I agreed to
do as requested. I immediately observed that practically all of the Sections needed
revision. This was proved by the results of my 30 years of research and publications,
including my 8-volume treatise. Instead of merely indicating the Sections in need of
revision (including all of them), I at once proceeded to prepare a "one-man revision"
of the entire Restatement (excluding only the Chapters on Remedies, which had been
drafted by myself as Associate Reporter). I worked steadily on this for about 18
months, covering the black letter sections, the comment[s] and illustrations. Many
sections I rewrote entirely, especially Chapter 9 on Interpretation and the Parol
Evidence Rule. As I completed my Revision of each Chapter, I sent it in handwritten
form to Judge Goodrich .... He had each such instalment typewritten and multi-
graphed for use by the Revision Reporter and his Committee and perhaps by others.
Thus far the Reporter has made steady use of my revision, although [he is] in no
respect bound to follow it....
Id.
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Braucher archives at the Harvard Law School Library where references to
this work abounded but no copy was found. Robert Braucher, professor at
the Harvard Law School, was the original Reporter for the revision of the
Restatement of Contracts. In 1971, when the Restatement (Second) was
about one-half completed, Professor Braucher resigned as Reporter to take
the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts. He gave his copy of Corbin's revision to Professor E. Allan
Farnsworth, who made little use of it, crediting Corbin's treatise as a more
influential source for the part of the Restatement (Second) for which he
was responsible.4 His copy no longer exists. 5 The American Law Institute
kept a copy, 6 but it has disappeared.7 Corbin gave his copy to Professor
Friedrich Kessler who presented it to a Yale Law Librarian but it had
disappeared from the library shelf when he later sought it out.8 The Yale
Law Library does not have it in its catalog. Professor Corbin's assertion
that Judge Goodrich caused it to be multigraphed and distributed to the
advisers appears incorrect. Although Braucher had a copy, the advisers
apparently did not. Braucher used to read to the advisory committee from
Corbin's revision,9 which may not have been quite the thorough revision of
each section that Corbin's description to the Yale Law Review editor
implies.' 0
4. Letter from E. Allan Farnsworth to the author (Dec. 7, 1992) (on file with author);
see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3, 5 (1981). Corbin's influence on Braucher's work on the
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) is acknowledged in Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the
Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 616 (1969).
5. Letter from E. Allan Farnsworth, supra note 4.
6. See Letter from Paul Wolkin, American Law Institute Assistant Director, to Michael
A. Varet, cc: to Professor Robert Braucher (Oct. 23, 1964) (Robert Braucher Papers, Harvard
Law School Library, MS Box 17, Folder 6) ("I have the Corbin Manuscript. The original
manuscript consisted of handwritten notes on the margins of the first Restatement of Contracts.
These handwritten notes were transcribed and the copy I have is a transcribed copy.").
7. Letter from Harry Kyriakodis, American Law Institute Librarian, to the author (Jan.
19, 1993) (on file with author).
8. Letter from Friedrich Kessler to the author (received Oct. 20, 1992) (on file with
author).
9. See Letter from Stewart Macauley to the author (Nov. 19, 1991) (on file with author)
('[W]e mere advisors didn't get to see the sacred document. Bob Braucher used to read from
it in respectful tones."); see also Letter from Arthur von Mehren to the author (Dec. 1, 1992)
(on file with author) ("I distinctly remember references to the Corbin revision of the first
Restatement of Contracts. However, I have no recollection of having received a copy of the
revision as an adviser to the Reporter."); Letter from Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters to the
author (Oct. 29, 1992) (on file with author) ("I regret that I cannot help you locate Arthur
Corbin's commentary on the first Restatement of Contracts. I came to the Restatement late
and never had a copy although I recall hearing about its existence.").
10. See Letter from Paul A. Wolkin, supra note 6 ("I have only one copy that runs
over 1,000 pages. Many of these pages have no notes on them at all ... ."); Letter from E.
Allan Farnsworth, supra note 4 ("Bob Braucher handed on to me some photocopies of pages
from the student edition of the Restatement. In the wide margins to some sections there were
some comments and occasional redrafts by Corbin-perhaps retyped by a secretary.").
LETTERS FROM CORBIN
In this unsuccessful quest for a copy of Corbin's Restatement, I found
in the Braucher archives at the Harvard Law School Library twelve extraor-
dinarily interesting letters that Corbin wrote to Braucher in Braucher's
capacity as Reporter." These letters shed much light on the preparation of
the first Restatement of Contracts, and on the relationship between Samuel
Williston and Arthur Corbin, the two scholars most responsible for its
preparation. They show much about the history of the Yale and Columbia
law schools, the realist movement, Corbin's position on the margins of that
movement, 2 and his assessment of some of its central figures. For these
reasons, these letters deserve publication. The annotations I supply are
mainly for the younger reader for whom the cast of characters who move
through these letters may be only dim historical shades.
In these letters, Corbin's essential thinking stands out. From first to
last he was an evolutionist and his corollary tenet was that evolution made
for uncertainty. Writing early in his career, he stated: "[there] will always
be two large fields of legal uncertainty-the field of the obsolete and dying,
and the field of the new born and growing."' 13 Fifty years later he was to
write in the same vein, but more poetically: "Our system of evolutionary
man-made law is also 'natural law.' It is as 'natural' as rain, as 'natural'
as birth and death."'' 4 In his eighty-seventh year, in a letter printed below,
11. Robert Braucher Papers, Harvard Law School Library, MS Box 17, Folders 5-7A.
12. Although Corbin is frequently labelled a realist, he saw himself differently. He wrote
to Llewellyn: "I can join cheerfully with you in your kind of 'Realism,' but I never wanted
to belong to the 'Realistic School' or any other school (except, perhaps, the Yale Law School).
There are too many self-styled 'Realists' whose eyes were opened and yet saw nothing." LAURA
KAL AN, LEGAL REALisM AT YALE: 1927-1960 241 n.83 (quoting Letter from Arthur L. Corbin
to Karl Llewellyn (Dec. 1, 1960) (R/13/15, Llewellyn Papers, University of Chicago Law
School Archives)).
Corbin wrote Karl Llewellyn in 1960 of 'a crisis' he had faced a 'fight for life as a
law teacher' in the late 1920s, when he had 'to drive a good beginning class' to
study the law of contracts against the competition of Hutchins and two others, 'all
three telling these beginners that there is 'no law,' only separate cases-that each
decision is a 'chigger' or stomach burp-that there are no organized molecules, only
individual atoms-and all three (however green behind the ears) telling it with
explosive, atomic power.
Id. at 107.
13. Arthur L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 YAr. Rav. 234, 243 (1914).
14. Arthur L. Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 183, 188 (1964).
For the contrast between Corbin's notions of the cultural evolution of the law and Williston's,
see Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of
Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 511 (1990), pointing out that Williston believed law had evolved
and was now explicable on the basis of rather static general principles, while Corbin believed
that society constantly changes and that legal rules are tentative generalizations deduced from
the vast outpouring of cases. The fact of these two very different perspectives explains one
major difference between their two treatises. Williston states rules and principles in the text
and supports them with string citations. Corbin's description of and quotations from cases in
the footnotes and texts forms the bulk of his treatise.
Despite their professional differences, the two men showed great respect, even affection,
for each other. Williston died at the age of 101, and in memorial of him, Corbin wrote
1993]
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he stated "I have read all the contract cases for the last 12 years; and I







I greatly appreciate your very kind letter. It would give me pleasure to
serve as your adviser and to meet with your Revising Committee; but I am
now 85, my sight is failing badly, and my hearing is defective. By this time
you may have seen (or heard about from Judge Goodrich) the results of
some very hard labor that I put in this summer up in Maine. Judge Goodrich
asked me to go over the Rest. Contracts and indicate the places that I
thought needed revision. I agreed to do so. On beginning, I found at once
that a very thorough revision of the whole is necessary. I am too deeply
interested in the Restatement to make that statement and stop work. 6
Instead it was necessary for me to demonstrate (even to myself) both the
why and the how of it. The effort was pleasant but exhausting. To draft a
generalization that deserves to be printed in black face (almost an impos-
sibility-did you ever look into the "Hornbook Series" of texts?), 17 on the
"Samuel Williston was to me like an older brother.... Never actually in his classroom ...
he was nevertheless my chief teacher in the law of contracts." Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel
Williston, 76 HAgv. L. REv. 1327, 1327 (1963); see also infra note 19 (quoting passages from
Williston's autobiography complimenting Corbin).
15. Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher (Nov. 13, 1961) (Robert Braucher
Papers, Harvard Law School Library, MS Box 17, Folder 7).
16. Many observers have expressed surprise that a "Realist" such as Corbin participated
in the making of a Restatement. Realists have little faith in the relevance of rules. But Corbin
had a strong belief in rules as working tools. For an excellent exposition of this, see Klau,
supra note 14, at 511-30. Occasionally, he could be quite firm as to the need for a rigid rule.
Addressing the "mailbox rule" he stated, "[w]e need a definite and uniform rule as to this."
1 ART'nt L. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 78, at 337 (1963). More typical, however, is
the following comment in the same section: "Dogmatic statements wherever they are found,
in court opinions, in learned treatises, in official 'Restatements,' cannot be relied on .. "
Id. at 335. One could multiply examples, but it is the rigid side of Corbin that more often
escapes notice. Consider his comment on Pym v. Campbell, 6 El.& BI. 370 (Q.B. 1856)
(holding that condition precedent to formation of contract may be shown by parol evidence
because there is no contract): "Even though the court's reasoning was unsound, the decision
rendered has been followed in far too many cases to be disapproved now." CORBIN, supra, §
83 n.97.
For Corbin's considered and mature statement as to "rules," see infra note 47.
17. Corbin here refers to the now discontinued practice of the West Publishing Company.
Books in its Hornbook Series used to have in bold type at the beginning of each section a
short summary of the rules contained in the section. For example, PROSSER ON TORTS contained
such "Blackletter" summaries in its first edition (1941) and its second edition (1955), but not
in the third (1964) and later editions.
LETTERS FROM CORBIN
basis of our complex, inconsistent and immense system of law, requires all
the intellectual resources that any man or group of men possesses. We
found it so in the Twenties; and you will find it so in the Sixties. I worked
happily with Sam Williston for 10 years" (more than half of that time
without pay), feeling most of the time that we were not competent for the
job. At the same time, I was sure that the effort was worth while-it was
so beneficial to me. I am still sure that the results were worth while. There
are Chapters and Sections in which we eliminated some dismal swamps,
recognized areas of evolutionary progress, and effected some analytical
improvements. At other points, there was failure to do any of these things.
You certainly have a "revising job"; but there is something worth revising.
First of all-and above all-let me assure you that in sending the mass
of stuff to Goodrich (stuff that they will reduce to type, if they can, in
Phila.) I did not have the slightest notion that I "had revised" the document
or had submitted anything as the last word. In my young experience there
is no "last word." My "stuff" was submitted merely to be as helpful as I
can. You and your Committee are to use it and abuse it just as you see
fit. I expect to continue work, although I can not hope to cover the whole
Restatement. From first to last, Sam Williston begged his advisers to submit
alternative drafts (not merely to criticize orally). I complied with his request,
18. In a tribute to Cornell Professor George Jarvis Thompson, Corbin briefly described
his collaboration with Williston on the first RESTATEMENT thus:
For nearly ten years, between 1922 and 1932, I worked many days with George,
Samuel Williston and others in preparing the two volumes known as the RESTATEMENT
oF THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs published by the American Law Institute. It involved
about four conferences per year, some of them a week in length, our small group
associating together both at meals and at work. In summer, this occurred by the
blue water on the coast of Maine; during the Christmas holidays, we met at a club
near Pinehurst, N.C. It was a most harmonious and industrious group; and the
mind and personality of George Thompson supplied a full share of the industry and
added much to the harmony and to the value of the work. Samuel Williston, the
chief Reporter, was 94 years of age September 24, of this year. I myself have been
retired from active teaching at Yale for 12 years. George was like our younger
brother, always helpful, suggestive, and affectionate.
Arthur L. Corbin, To Professor George Jarvis Thompson, 41 CoRNELL L.Q. 4 (1955).
Williston's recollection of the locale of these meetings is somewhat more detailed:
Except during the summer and at the time of the Christmas vacation most of our
conferences were held in the Law School of one of the teachers who took part in
the discussion. Many were held in Cambridge, many in New Haven, where I enjoyed
the hospitality of the Graduates' Club; two were in Ithaca, where the Willard Straight
Hall gave us excellent living quarters; one or more were in Philadelphia.
SAMUEL Wr1LLSTON, LiFE AND LAW: AN AuToBIoaRAPHY 312 (1941).
George Jarvis Thompson was the professor who taught me contract law. He was the co-
author, with Williston, of the revised (second) edition of Williston's treatise. He was an
effective teacher, one of the best at Cornell. He struck the class as a thoroughly decent and
pleasant human being. Toward the end of the academic year, he and his wife gave a party
for the first year class. It came as a shock to us when we learned that every student received
an invitation except the two black students. This was the spring of 1953. Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided one year later.
1993]
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in fact submitting at his special request a complete first draft of the Chapter
on Assignment. There is one page in Sam's autobiography that I greatly
appreciate. 19 The Chapters on Judicial Remedies were prepared by me as
his Co-Reporter. No draft ever remained unaffected by the discussions and
criticisms of 4 Conferences. I should like to take part in your conferences;
but that is impossible. If in the course of the work you are in New Haven,
I should deeply welcome the chance to talk over with you some of your
problems. Probably no one else knows the contents and the history of this
Restatement as well as I do.
Yours most sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin







I have now finished my notes on the chapters on Third Party Benef.,
"Joint" Contracts (God Save us!), and Assignment. 20 You may be surprised,
19. Because of the context of the letter, Corbin presumably refers to this passage:
My greatest indebtedness [in preparing the Restatement] was to Arthur Corbin. His
mastery of the law of contracts was only equalled by his generosity in contributing
his best efforts to a work that for the most part would pass under another's name.
He had moreover made a special study of terminology, and his keen eye for
ambiguities and inexactness of expression saved me in many slippery places. His
friendship and that of the Director [William Draper Lewis] and Professor Thompson
remain major benefits to me of my work with the Institute. For a part of the
Restatement of Contracts Arthur Corbin assumed the position of reporter and I
acted as one of the advisers.
WnmsToN, supra note 18, at 312.
There is another passage in Williston's autobiography concerning Corbin that bears
mentioning. During their summer stay in Maine, Williston generally played golf at the end of
the working day.
Here Arthur Corbin began to allow his increasing years to swerve him from his
youthful devotion to tennis to a game supposed to be more suitable to the elderly.
At first, he merely walked around the links with us. Younger and stronger than I,
he would generously carry my clubs; but as often happens, it was not long before
the caddy's game was far superior to that of the man whose clubs he had carried.
Id. at 313. Was this last clause about-golf, or a metaphor for larger things? When I first read
it some years ago, I understood it as metaphor.
Williston's autobiography is often gripping in its compelling frankness concerning Willis-
ton's frequent bouts with mental illness.
20. Presumably these "notes" are the notes in the margin of the Restatement that Mr.
Wolkin, Assistant Director of the ALI, received in 1964. See Letter from Paul Wolkin, supra
note 6.
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as I was, at the extent and difficulty of the necessary revision. I still hope
that other chapters will not need so much. Of late, I have not felt very
well; but the work goes on. I have 3 other jobs in process.
You will find great variance in the usefulness of "advisors." Some will
need more advice than they give. Few, if any, will go over the subject
matter with the laborious and constructive care that any Reporter needs.
All of them may be helpful critics, calling attention to lapses and failures
to take account of legal progress. I will suggest a few names, although my
close contacts are few.
Friedrich Kessler (Y.L.S.) a scholar, a clear thinker, and a lovely man.
I have tested him in many ways. He probably knows my own treatise more
thoroughly than anyone else. That his early work was German is an
advantage. 2' He is working too hard here to take on much additional labor.
Grant Gilmore (Y.L.S.) former student of mine-scholarly man.Y I
think that he did good work on the Uniform Com'l Code.
Addison Mueller (U.C.L.A., formerly YLS).23 My best student, in his
time was one of our best teachers here. Nothing against him in his resigning
21. Friedrich Kessler received his Dr. jur. in Berlin. Some of his finest and most influential
writings are partly comparative in nature. These include Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa
in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study,
77 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1964); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLuM. L. Ray. 629 (1943).
A precursor to the current law and economics movement was Friedrich Kessler & Richard
H. Stem, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YAE L.J. 1 (1959).
Professor Kessler is co-author of a contracts casebook that is used by many law teachers.
The original edition mras FRIEDRICH KESSLER & MALCOLM PrA SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES
AND MATER.ALs (1953). The current edition is FRIEDRiCH KESSLER, GRANT GILMoRE & ANTHONY
KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
For a tribute to Professor Kessler, see Grant Gilmore, Friedrich Kessler, 84 YALE L.J.
672 (1975).
22. Grant Gilmore was one of the major actors in twentieth century law. Perhaps his
best work was THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). He was also co-editor of FRmDRICH
KESSLER & GRANT Gn.LMOE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATEa.LS (1970). His most useful works
for the legal profession were GRANT GmmoRE & CARLES L. BLACic, JR., THE LAW OF
AD.nLALTY (1957) and the two volume treatise, SicuRnrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
(1965), which stemmed from his work in drafting Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
He is remembered by Anthony Jon Waters, For Grant Gilmore, 42 MD. L. REv. 65 (1983),
and by various colleagues, In Memory of Grant Gilmore, 92 YALE L.J. 1 (1982). A bibliography
of his writings appears in 92 YALE L.J. 12 (1982).
Contract scholars know him best by his DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974), a book which
apparently was intended to be taken largely tongue-in-cheek, a spoof, that took its title from
the "death of God" theologians who were fashionable at the moment. Surprisingly, many
took it to be quite serious. According to its parody of history, the concept of contract was
invented by Christopher Columbus Langdell, perfected by Oliver Wendell Holmes, and prop-
agated by a scrivener named Samuel Williston. Certainly, Gilmore was having fun, and knew
better. Dozens of books entitled "Contracts" preceded Langdell's efforts on this planet.
Although Gilmore knew better, some of his junior colleagues in the teaching profession took
him too seriously.
23. Addison Mueller's innovative casebook, CONTRACT IN CONTEXT (1952), is described
in KALMAN, supra note 12, at 189-90:
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:755
here. I got him his job here (and was chief influence in getting his
professorship at 20,000 in U.C.L.A.) Original, tough-minded, hard worker,
fine man, knows my work well, but no "yes-man". 10 yrs in Lumber
business.
Harold Shepherd (Stanford) You probably know him and his work.2 I
spent one day with him at Stanford and liked him.
Karl Llewellyn & Soia Ment[slchikoff (U. Chi.) They were at H.L.S.
with you. Karl was as stimulating a student as I ever had. A bit poetic and
The casebook provided a step-by-step account of the problems of a businessman,
Mr. Ohner, encountered in having an apartment house built. Each chapter covered
a set of events Ohner faced, from borrowing money to pay for the structure, to
obtaining plans from the architect, to completion of the poorly constructed build-
ing .... In short, Mueller tried to provide a context for contract law. He included
no index because 'its pinpoint type reference' could not be reconciled with 'his basic
idea that students should not be encouraged to read the law out of context.' He
organized the book on functional lines to eliminate 'the artificial one-concept-at-a-
time organization of'the traditional course.'
Id.
One can infer that the book did not succeed as a teaching tool. In 1971 he published
CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION, the successor to which is ARTHUR RosETr, CONTRACT
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION (4th ed. 1988). Rosett explains that, like earlier editions, "[tihe
book continues to be divided in two parts: an initial introductory survey of the essential
concept of contract law, followed by three chapters that look at the special context of sales,
personal services, and construction contracts through materials organized around practical
problems. Id. at xx. Rosett explains that Addison Mueller's "career was a bridge between the
era of the great systemizers, particularly his mentor, Professor Arthur Corbin, and the school
of skeptical pragmatists and critical analysts." Id.
Professor Mueller also contributed to the periodical literature. Perhaps foremost among
these publications are Addison Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576 (1969);
Addison Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
833. In this last article he takes the position that contract remedies are largely irrelevant to
the resolution of disputes. On this point I have publicly disagreed, arguing that legal remedies
are "weapon[s} of last resort when other methods of obtaining one's goals fail. Similarly the
reluctance of many to resort to law to resolve contract disputes may indicate a healthy social
system rather than the irrelevance of contract law." JOHN D. CALAmAR & JOSEPH M. PEuLno,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 11 (3d ed. 1987). This passage first appeared in the second edition
in 1977 at page 11. Today, after some years as an arbitrator and consultant, I am more
inclined to believe that the unwillingness of many to resort to contract remedies is more a
function of the high emotional and financial cost of obtaining a remedy than it is a function
of either the irrelevance of contract law or the health of our social system.
24. Harold Shepherd had a varied academic career, having taught at Wyoming, Stanford,
Chicago, Cincinnati, Washington and Duke, serving as Dean at Wyoming, Washington and
Duke. In an era when the number of Contracts casebooks was small, in 1939 Foundation
Press published his CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1939), which was a
revision of GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, CASES ON CONTRACTS (3d ed.). A second edition followed
in 1946. A new edition with a transformed title appeared in 1952: CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT
REMEDIES (3d ed. 1952). In 1957 a fourth edition appeared with Harry H. Wellington as co-
editor. In 1960, a new casebook, HAROLD SHEPHERD & BYRON D. SHER, LAW IN SocIErY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, CASES & MATERIALS (1960), was launched. With
others, Shepherd prepared the Washington State annotations to the RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS.
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emotional; 25 but there is no better man on a legal problem. 26 A N.City Bank
V.P. wanted to fire him (as a law clerk). The Legal V.P. said "No you
don't. The Chairman of Columbia Bd. of Trustees wanted to fire him.
Dean Young B. Smith laid his own resignation on the table. After Karl's
preliminary pamphlet on Uniform Com'l Code-Sales, the Columbia Trustee
said that he had been mistaken (having carefully studied it). Judge Swan,
Willard Luther, Sterry Waterman & I were Karl's advisors on U.C.C. Sales.
Karl was the best and most original Reporter that I have known. No "pride
of opinions", quick to understand and appreciate, not easy to knock out.2 7
Wm Draper Lewis told me that Karl made the best report to the A.L.I.
25. A recent article demonstrates rather convincingly the strong influence of the German
Romantic tradition on Llewellyn and on his work. James Whitman, Commercial Law and the
American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code,
97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987). Llewellyn's biographer, however, expresses doubt that German legal
thought played any significant role in molding his thoughts. William Twining, Book Review,
100 YALE L.J. 1093, 1097 (1991) (reviewing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN
AMERICA (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989) (written by Llewellyn in German
for German lawyers)). He makes no reference to Whitman's thesis.
As in the case of Friedrich Kessler, Llewellyn was fluent in German. Although he was
born in the United States and his family background was not Germanic, he had studied in a
German high school. At the outbreak of World War I, he volunteered for, and was inducted
into the Prussian army, where he was awarded the Iron Cross. He was discharged for refusing
to take an oath of allegiance to the Kaiser. Such an oath would have jeopardized his American
citizenship. See WIiuAm TwnINx, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 91, 479-87
(1973) (describing Llewellyn's war experiences). Despite his reputation as a hard-drinking man,
his productivity was enormous. He wrote over 250 published works. Despite what his biographer
charitably describes "as one of the most exotic prose styles in all legal literature," id. at ix,
he was undoubtedly the most influential and productive of the "realists." A selected bibliog-
raphy of his works appears in Twining's biography. Id. at 555-61. Among his most significant
works were Tan BRAumLE BUSH, first printed for students at Columbia in 1930, but later
published by Oceana in 1951. Many law students found this their somewhat jolting introduction
to law. His culminating works were, Tn COMMON LAW TRADmoN-DEcIDING APPEALS (1960),
and JURISPRUDENCE; REALISM IN THEORY A PRACTICE (1962). His papers at the Library of
the University of Chicago are described in WILLIAM TWINING, Tan KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS
(1968), and supplemented in RAYMOND M. ELLINWOOD, JR. & WuLim L. TWINING, Tan KARL
LLEWELLYN PAPERS: A GUIDE TO Tm COE cTI ON (1970). See also N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism
About the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Corre-
spondence, 1927-31, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 921 (examining Llewellyn's perception of and Dean
Roscoe Pound's criticism of Realist movement).
26. Llewellyn co-authored with E. Adamson Hoebel, a prominent anthropologist, a case
study of Cheyenne law, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941). Hoebel later wrote of this collaboration
as follows:
I had with each case carried the analysis of its import to the limits of my ability.
Yet again and again, as our discussions proceeded, he would challenge or add,
defend what he had added, if defending were needed, with inexhaustible brilliance,
until I in awe one day queried, "Karl, how do you do it?" -"Why, Ad," he replied,
with more pride in his profession than in himself, "I am a case-trained lawyer-
and what is more, I am one of the three best in America."
E. Adamson Hoebel, Karl Llewellyn: Anthropological Jurisprude, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 735, 742-
43 (1964).
27. See Arthur L. Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 804 (1962); Grant
Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813 (1962).
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Council that he had heard (and he had heard them all). Soia M., Karl's
wife, is a fine supplement to Karl, very clear mind, sound masculine 28 legal
judgment, 29 keeps Karl's feet on the ground. They both call me "Dad."
Not surprising that I like 'em. P.S. Karl had signed a round robin letter to
Pres. Butler asking him not to appoint Smith as Dean.30 But quite unlike
28. To Corbin, whose social formation was in the nineteenth century, the description
masculine was highly complimentary. Soia Mentschikoff, a student of Llewellyn's, became
Llewellyn's third wife. Llewellyn was lured to Chicago from Columbia. Both Llewellyn and
Mentschikoff were made offers at the same time. The President of the University of Chicago
was Robert Hutchins, who had almost certainly been a student of Llewellyn's at Yale.
29. Soia Mentschikoff was on the faculty of the University of Chicago from 1951 to
1974, when she became Dean of the University of Miami Law School. She continued as Dean
until 1982, when she became Distinguished Professor Emeritus at that School. When Corbin
states that she was with Braucher at the Harvard Law School, he presumably refers to her
status there as a visiting professor in the years 1947-49. She worked with Karl Llewellyn, from
1942-51, on the revision of the Sales Act and ultimately the creation of the Uniform Commercial
Code. She authored COmmERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1970), and co-
authored, SoIA MENTSCMXOFF & IRWIN P. STOTZKY, TBE THEoRY AND CRAFT OF A MEEcAN
LAw-ELEMENTS (1981). The strength of her personality expressed as a teacher, lecturer, and
advocate for the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code is captured in E. Allan
Farnsworth et al., In Memoriam-Soia Mentschikoff, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 1
(1984).
30. When Dean Huger W. Jervey resigned the Columbia deanship in 1928, Professor
Young B. Smith was appointed Acting Dean. The faculty was. divided on the permanent
succession. The realists supported Professor Herman Oliphant while others supported Professor
Smith.
President [Nicholas Murray] Butler appears to have been fully aware of the situation
and he despaired of the Faculty coming to any agreement. At last, after consulting
with Harlan F. Stone, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, then a Trustee of Columbia,
and other eminent alumni, he decided to take matters into his own hands. Without
drawing into his confidence the Faculty's special committee on the deanship the
President announced.... he would recommend to the Trustees that Professor Smith
be appointed Dean.
President Butler 's announcement created an immediate uproar. Many members of
the Faculty, particularly those who supported Professor Oliphant's candidacy, felt
that Butler's action was autocratic and in flagrant disregard of what they conceived
to be the Faculty's traditional prerogatives. A plenary session of the Faculty was
convened at the Men's Faculty Club on 117th Street to protest the action; absent
members were summoned from as far away as Virginia. The Faculty sat all day
Sunday, May 6 [19281, and well into the night .... The great meeting of protest
thus broke up without accomplishing anything .... [Tihe Trustees made Young B.
Smith Dean.
The dissident professors were not disposed to acquiesce in the revolt, a fact of which
other institutions were aware. William 0. Douglas, Assistant Professor of Law,
resigned in protest against what he said was President Butler's highhanded action....
[h]e accepted Dean Robert Hutchin's invitation to join the Yale Law School Faculty.
Hessel E. Yntema, Associate Professor of Roman Law, also resigned.... He and
Leon C. Marshall, Visiting Professor, whose temporary appointment terminated the
same day, went to Johns Hopkins University, where an Institute of Law was being
set up under Walter Wheeler Cook to translate into institutional form his plans for
a research school of jurisprudence that would be devoted to the objective study of
law as a social institution. Herman Oliphant, Professor of Law, also left to join
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Oliphant,3 Karl did not resign. Instead, he worked the harder. He has a
loyal heart. Karl overworked on the U.C. Code; he had to get by many
"practical men." Karl is probably "fed up" with codifying.
Get advisors who have written and published (first class stuff), if you
can. You should have a Judge or two. I had some help from Cardozo. But
he must be a live wire.
Judge Tom Swan (my old pal still, and former Dean.) Hohfeld and I
chose him.32 There is none better (see L. Hand's opinion).3 3 A fine critic
with the best judgment. But he is nearly 82.
Judge Roger Traynor (Calif. Sup. Ct.)34 Formerly a professor in Calif.
L.S. His court has rendered some excellent Contract opinions. I give Roger
much of the credit. I talked with him a few times in Berkeley (1949-50)
and liked him.
Judge Wyzanski-you know him.35 I like his opinions. I heard him take
part in a Council discussion with Karl and others.
Cook at Johns Hopkins .... Underhill Moore, Professor of Law was invited to
Johns Hopkins, too, but he regarded that venture as unsound, and remained at
Columbia, speaking to no one, not even to say 'Good Morning,' while he negotiated
with the authorities at Yale. Moore finally resigned as of January 1, 1930 to accept
a position with Yale's Institute of Human Relations at an annual salary of $15,000.
STAFF OF THE FOUNDATION FOR REsEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF Jurus
GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF COLUMBIA UNIVERsITY 304-05 (1955) (footnotes
omitted).
31. Corbin makes it clear in the two references to Herman Oliphant in these letters that
Oliphant was not one of his favorite people. Oliphant was the leader of the "Realists." Other
than a few law review articles, and statistical surveys, his contributions were ephemeral. One
of his students, the late Orville H. Mann, confided in me that he could remember only one
point from Oliphant's course in contracts-there is no such thing as law. Having been denied
the Columbia deanship, he departed for the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law, a research
institute that quickly floundered. The Institute of Law "was set up as an independent school
of the University in June, 1928, and began its work in October of that year." JOHN C.
FRENCH, A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY FOUNDED BY JOHNs HoPKINs 247 (1946). "Early in
1933 the financial situation of the University reached such a point that the Trustees were
unwilling to incur further deficits for the Institute. Reluctantly they voted that its work should
be suspended indefinitely on July first of that year." Id. at 248.
32. Yale President Arthur Twining Hadley appointed "Corbin and Hohfeld heads of a
committee to select a new dean." KALmAN, supra note 12, at 99.
33. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167 (1947) (remarks on the
occasion of Judge Swan's seventieth birthday).
34. Roger Traynor was a Justice of the California Supreme Court from 1940 to 1964
and Chief Justice from 1964 to 1970. His opinions are the subject of a symposium issue, 13
STAN. L. Rav. 717-864 (1961). Included therein is Stewart Macauley, Justice Traynor and the
Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812 (1961). Many of Traynor's achievements are recorded
in a California Law Review symposium. 53 CAL. L. REv. 5 (1965). Professor Bernard Schwartz
ranks Roger Traynor with the likes of Marshall, Kent and Cardozo as one of the ten greatest
judges in American history. Bernard Schwartz, The Judicial Ten: America's Greatest Judges,
1979 S. In. U. L.J. 405, 407. Memorials to Justice Traynor can be found at 35 HAsTiNas
L.J. 741 (1984); 71 CAL. L. REv. 1037 (1983); 69 VA. L. REv. 1381 (1983).
35. Judge Charles Wyzanski, appointed in 1941, at the age of 35, to the United States
District Court for Massachusetts by Franklin Roosevelt, was one of the great Federal District
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Judge Hammond (Md. Sup. Ct.) Don't know him. I have merely seen
a few of his opinions; they read well.36
Judge Chas. E. Clark (former Dean here)-a first rate legal mind. I
suppose that his work as Reporter for the Fed Code of Procedure was
excellent; and he must have been able to work with others. a7 [But as Dean
he often misunderstood others and others often misunderstood him. This
is off the record.] 3s
There may be a man on the N.J. Sup. Ct. How about Harry Heher? 39
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
Court Judges of the twentieth century. See Derek C. Bok et al., In Memoriam: Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1987); see also Mark L. Wolf, Few are Chosen: The
Judicial Appointments of Oliver Holmes, Jr., and Charles Edward Wyzanski, Jr., 74 MASS.
L. REv. 221 (1989).
36. Hall Hammond later became Chief Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals. Corbin
must recently have read such decisions as Lutz v. Porter, 112 A.2d 480 (Md. 1955), and Dove
v. White, 126 A.2d 835 (1956). They are lucid, well-reasoned, but otherwise unremarkable.
37. While Charles Clark was a faculty member, he and Robert Hutchins, another future
Yale Dean, sought to change the school to "the first honors or research school in America."
KALMAN, supra note 12, at 105 (quoting a press release prepared by Hutchins). Corbin and Swan
are said to have expressed disgust with the proposal. Id. at 106. Hutchins' realization that the
press release "created enormous consternation" is recorded in Robert Whitman, Soia Mentschikoff
and Karl Llewellyn: Moving Together to the University of Chicago Law School, 24 CoNN. L.
REv. 1119, 1121 (1992). A related proposal, involving the reduction of the number of students,
was put into effect over Corbin's objections. KALMAN, supra note 12, at 106.
Clark's body of writings "includes by one count 14 books and 157 articles .. " Steven
Flanders, Comments on Procedural Law and Judicial Administration: A Parable from the
Career of Charles E. Clark, 12 JUST. SYs. J. 85, 88 (1987). Clark, consistent with a major
strain of realism which looked toward the social sciences for guidance, poured an immense
amount of energy into empirical-statistical studies of civil procedure, but "[h]ardly ever ...
did he succeed in drawing precise prescriptions from clear empirical findings." Id. at 88. On
the general failure of the realists to actualize their aspiration of blending law with the social
sciences, see KALMAN, supra note 12, at 88-97.
Clark is perhaps best known as the primary drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
for his role as Judge and Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, and for his hornbook, CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDEOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING
(1928, 2d ed. 1947). Charles Alan Wright and Harry M. Reasoner edited and published a
collection of Clark's essays on procedure in PROCEDURE, THE HANDMAm OF JusTIcE; ESSAYS
OF JUnGE CHARLES E. CLARK (1965). Clark's papers are collected in the Sterling Library of
Yale University. See MARY BENJAMIN, THE CHARLES E. CLARK PAPERS (1982).
A paper that should be of special interest to contracts and remedies scholars is Arthur
J. Jacobson, The Equitable Administration of Long-Term Relations: An Appreciation of Judge
Clarks's Opinion in Parev Products, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 45 (Peninah Petruck
ed., 1991). The book in which the paper appears was published in commemoration of the
100th anniversary of Clark's birth.
38. Corbin apparently was reluctant to issue this mild criticism of Clark's personality.
For comments by other colleagues and acquaintances, see KALMAN, supra note 12, at 116-17.
Especially frank are the comments of Clark's son. Elias Clark, Memories of My Father, in
JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 153, 160-63 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991).
39. Corbin, whose preoccupation with issues surrounding the admissibility of parol








The patient survived; and hopes to go to Maine for the summer within
a few days. My address there will be West Boothbay Harbor, Maine.
Probably the sea air there will help to build up my depleted energy.
Of course, you found the revision a much bigger job than you expected.
I hope that my notes will assist in producing a result that will deserve to
last another 30 years. My steady work for 30 years discovered many weak
spots and accumulated much new factual background. Sam & I were likely
to depend on one case that we had accepted and taught-especially if the
opinion was by Holmes, Cardozo, Hand. A very striking example is § 197.
But a major weakness of Rest. I is due to 30 more years of life with their









I have made a careful reading of your Preliminary Draft, §§ 1-74; and
I find it exceedingly good. I have sent some notes and comments on it to
Judge Goodrich, requesting him to have them typewritten and sent to you
in time for your consideration before the February Conference.
Many of my notes are very limited in character. There are a few
Sections to which I devoted a good deal of time and effort. In every such
instance, the Section is excellent; but I hope that you will find some of my
suggestions worth while.
I hope that some of your other advisors are able and willing to add
constructive suggestions. About all that Williston and I ever got was
intelligent listening and comment at the Conference table.
Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1953) and Harker v. McKissock,
96 A.2d 660 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953), gratifying indeed. They are entirely consistent
with, and draw heavily from, Corbin's treatise. They preceded, by fifteen years, Roger
Traynor's better-known opinions in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968), and Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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My sight grows more impaired and at times makes my work difficult.
It is not impossible that I have at times overlooked something in the Draft.
I should much like to take part in the Conference in Phila, especially to
support some of the amendments you have made to the first Edition; but
it is not possible.
Please be well assured that I take great satisfaction in your Draft and
have not the least doubt that the Revision is and will be a vast improvement
over Edition 1. The amendments that I suggest are really very few-fewer
than any Draft of mine would have had to accept. Your draft gives evidence
of immense labor. It would have been very pleasant to discuss matters with
you in person. But I am lucky enough to be able to keep on working as







Your draft is so good that I could not withhold expression of approval,
to both you and Judge Goodrich. It may help a bit also if (at my decrepit
86) I relate some of the experience of the original Committee. I have not met
your advisors; but I feel sure that all of them will be intent on producing the
best Revision possible rather than on demonstrating their own superiority.
That was true of all of Williston's advisers. Oliphant, however, was too
impatient and self-confident and he resigned after perhaps a year.
The criticisms of your draft will test it for weak spots, the critic picking
his shot; so that you will (at first) feel on the defensive. I felt that strongly
when I moved from Adviser to Reporter on Remedies. But you have appointed
advisers for just that purpose. I judge that it has never disturbed your
equanimity to admit uncertainty (or even error) to your students. Hold your
ground, let them argue against each other, ask them to draft a substitute, and
after enough discussion dictate the result to the stenographer and reserve it
for further consideration. [A stenog. report of the whole discussion is useless.]
No doubt Williston felt less "trepidation" in 1923 than you do; but I
would have felt more. He was older than the advisers (13 yrs older than I)
and he had published much more. Also, he had had large contacts with bench
and bar, and "he had a way with him." He asked his advisers (if they would)
to go through his treatise and point out spots needing correction or amendment.
Nobody did this but me. I went over his Vol. 1 page by page, covering the
margins with pencilled notes. Then I shipped the volume to him. On receiving
his first draft, I sent him 65 typed pages of comment. He treated me so well
at the Conference that it never ceased to be a pleasure to work with him-
even when we differed. At his request, I wrote the first draft of the Chapter
on Assignment and he made it the basis of his first draft. He often said that
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§ 90 was my Section; but the fact is that it is now in exactly the form in
which he first submitted it. Every other adviser opposed it; but we bludgeoned
them until they seemed to be convinced? °
Williston was hard to move from a position Qustly so); but he could be
moved (and was in Third Party Benefs. and Assignment).
I am glad that you refer so often to the Uniform Com. Code. Karl L.
was a prime Reporter (quick, scintillating, no "pride of opinion"). He had
good helpers on Sales-especially Tom Swan, Willard Luther, Soia-besides
me. New York slowed up its enactment (not because of the Sales part); but
it will make its way, and will be used as much as the Restatement, even if
not enacted.
Some attacks will be directed at me rather than at you. The Courts have
not abused my treatise; but many judges continue to repeat that parol evidence
for interpretation of an "integration" (assumed to exist) is not admissible if
the words are "plain and clear" and "unambiguous." In most such cases
40. Section 90 gave the black letter formulation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Although the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS avoided the phrase "promissory estoppel," the term
was used and perhaps coined by Samuel Williston in his 1921 treatise on contracts. See 1
SAMUEL WILLSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1921), where the cases that foreshadowed
the doctrine are collected, woven together, and given sympathetic treatment and the label
"promissory estoppel." Williston there toys with a more expansive theory whereby promissory
estoppel and consideration would be fused. He puts forward and then rejects a tentative
definition of consideration "as any legal benefit to the promisor or legal detriment to the
promisee given or suffered by the latter in reasonable reliance on the promise," but adds that
"[s]uch a definition eliminates the necessity of a request by the promisor for the consideration.
The proposition is by no means without intrinsic merit, but it should be recognized that if
generally applied it would much extend liability on promises, and that at present it is opposed
to the great weight of authority." Id. at 313.
Grant Gilmore relates the substance of various conversations with Corbin in the 1950s
on the source of RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90, while confessing the possible slippage
between fact and memory. According to this narrative, Williston wrote and got approval for
a narrow definition of consideration in RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 which enshrined the
notion that consideration necessarily involved a bargained-for exchange. Corbin then convinced
the Restaters of the need to provide for the many cases where the court had found for the
plaintiff because of unbargained-for reliance on a promise. GRANT GuMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 62-65 (1974). Corbin in this letter credits to Williston the authorship of section 90.
He neither confirms nor denies having convinced Williston of the need for a section of this
kind. Note that he speaks of their partnership in bludgeoning the other Advisers into accepting
the doctrine. Some of Corbin and Williston's contemporaries credited the doctrine to Williston.
See, e.g., William J. Lloyd, Consideration and the Seal in New York-An Unsatisfactory
Legislative Program, 46 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1946) (stating that promissory estoppel was
"promoted by Professor Williston because of his conviction that the area of enforceability of
promises should be expanded to include many gift promises .. "). Lloyd had been teaching
at Syracuse since 1938. A more telling source is Karl Llewellyn. In an article "dedicated to
Arthur L. Corbin, my father in the law," he credits Williston with inventing the topic of
"contracts without consideration," while preserving the idea of consideration as bargained-for
detriment. "In this lies a fine compromise between honor to the past and furtherance of case-
law reform as has ever been in our system conceived." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law
in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1262 n.48 (1938). The dedication appears
in the initial footnote. Further doubt is cast on Gilmore's version of the origins of Section 90
by Klau, supra note 14, at 533-39.
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(not in ) in which this is said, counsel have merely argued for an "after-
thought" interpretation without offering any substantial parol evidence to
support it. The old Restatement supports the judges to a large extent. On this
subject I have drafted a series of brief, limited, definite generalizations that
may help to win assent. I inclose them herewith for such use (or disuse) as
you may wish to make. Don't trouble to write to me concerning them; you
are already overworked.
If at any time I can support you against attack, or can assist in a solution,
don't fail to let me know. Both my time and my capability grow more limited.
No doubt, Judge Goodrich will be at your right hand. I have confidence
in him. Director Lewis always opened our Conferences and was always
helpful-sometimes obtuse (not posing as a specialist) but always ready to
join in a laugh at himself.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
Interpretation. Some general statements.
1. The primary and ultimate purpose of interpretation of the words of
a contract is to determine and make effective the Intention of the Contracting
Parties.
2. No contract should ever be interpreted and enforced with a meaning
that neither party gave to it.
3. There is no rule of law or language that requires a party to a contract
to comply with any standard of usage or interpretation in choosing the words
used in the contract.
4. No party to a contract should ever be bound by an interpretation
that is determined exclusively by the linguistic education and experience of the
Court (trial or appellate).
5. When a court excludes relevant evidence of the meaning given to the
words of a contract by the parties thereto, on the ground that the words are
not "ambiguous," it is making interpretation depend exclusively on its own
linguistic education and experience.
6. When a court enforces a contract in accordance with an interpretation
that seems "plain and clear" to the court and excludes relevant convincing
evidence that the parties intended a different interpretation, it is "making a
contract for the parties," one that they did not themselves make.
7. No word or group of words in any language has an "objective"
meaning separate from and independent of its actual use by one person to
convey his thoughts to another person.
8. No writing is ever an "integration" of the terms of a contract unless
the parties thereto have manifested their assent to it as such.
9. No writing, whatever its form and content, is sufficient to establish
its existence and operation as an "integration" assented to as such by the
parties.
10. When a valid contract (written or oral) is made, the parties thereby
discharge and displace antecedent agreements and negotiations (written or oral)
that are inconsistent with it.
LETTERS FROM CORBIN
11. There is no way to determine whether evidence of an antecedent
agreement or negotiation varies or contradicts an "integration" until after the
"integration" has been interpreted.
12. A party to a bargaining exchange (written or oral) is never bound
in accordance with an interpretation different from the one that he gave to
its words, if he neither knew nor had reason to know that the other party
gave them a different interpretation.
13. A party to a bargaining exchange (written or oral) may be bound in
accordance with an interpretation that he did not give to its words, if
(a) he knew or had reason to know that the other party in fact gave
that interpretation to the words, and
(b) the other party neither knew nor had reason to know that the
first party did not give the words that interpretation.
14. One who makes a promise in a unilateral contract that is not a
bargaining exchange, and in reasonable reliance on which neither the promisee
nor an intended beneficiary substantially changes his position in a manner
that the promisor had reason to foresee, is not bound in accordance with an






I received your new proposals in re "Consideration" some two weeks
ago; but I was too old and weary to clarify my thoughts at once and to write
to you at once. Now, I am still old and weary; but my "thoughts" are
handwritten. I have thought best to send them to Herbert Goodrich to be put
in type, so that you may have them in that form. They were not easy of
expression.
I have sent to him for typing, also, my critical discussion of Sokoloff v.
Strick, 172 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1961),41 dealing with the "parol evidence rule." It
41. This case is noted at great length and strongly criticized in 3 ARTHmu L. CoRaN,
CoRnmN oN CONTRACTS § 577 n.34 (Supp. 1992). The criticism of this case in the Pocket Parts
and in the passage in the letter referring to the case reflects Corbin's consuming concern with
the tendency of courts to give great respect to writings at the expense of the parties' actual
intent, which is often more fully articulated in oral discussions. This concern is found
throughout his treatise and in many passages of his letters to Robert Braucher.
In his last writings he more pithily described the holding of Sokoloff v. Strick:
"[P]laintiff sought a decree that a deed of trust and a promissory note were
inoperative for the reason that they had expressly been executed as a 'sham,' the
court threw out the case without even requiring the defendant to file an answer.
The court said that the plaintiff was making an 'attempt to evade, circumvent and
nullify the parol evidence rule,' a rule which 'must be firmly maintained if the
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may assist you later on. My analysis of that "rule" and its operation gives
great offense to the "illusion of certainty," beloved of many. But I have read
all the Contract cases for the last 12 years; and I know that "certainty" does
not exist and that the illusion perpetrates injustice.







Friday, March 16, 10 A.M. will be quite convenient. I shall be glad to
see you. 4 2 I am very deaf and I have only half an eye; but I can talk with
you. I have been hit hard; but I am on an even keel and would like to see
you.
Karl Llewellyn was almost my son. He and Soia have known me as
"Dad" for years.
On March 1, my third son, David, aged 51, went down with the jet
plane in N.Y. He was chief counsel for the Underwriters for United, Pan
Am., Douglas, and others, in charge of hundreds of crash suits. 43 He was
integrity of written instruments is to be sustained instead of being rendered mean-
ingless,' even the integrity of an instrument that has no 'integrity'! The decision is
shown no mercy in the author's note in the 1964 Pocket Supplement to vol. 3,
Section 577, note 34. The judge who wrote the opinion repeated his language in
two subsequent cases, but in Caplan v. Saltzman, two judges dissented, saying:
'While the parol evidence rule may be a 'Rock of Gibraltar' in the sea of contracts,
it must not also be a Rock of Scylla upon which contractual obligations are
shipwrecked and destroyed,' and in Kready v. Bechtel, Lutz & Jost, the court held
that the parol evidence was admissible, the judge who repeats his words in Sokoloff
being a lone dissenter, saying: 'The majority decision unintentionally, but without
the slightest doubt realistically undermines a myriad of recent and controlling
decisions of this court.' How necessary it is for a lawyer and a judge to keep abreast
of the decisions and formulations (not merely a few) as 'the law' proceeds in its
evolutionary growth.
Corbin, supra note 13, at 191 (emphasis in the original) (footnotes omitted).
42. On January 26, 1962, Judge Henry Friendly wrote to Robert Braucher suggesting
"it would be a most gracious thing, if . . . you could stop in New Haven and see the old
gentleman." Letter from Henry Friendly to Robert Braucher (Jan. 26, 1962) (Robert Braucher
Papers, Harvard Law School Library, MS Box 17, Folder 7).
43. See N.Y. Tims, Mar. 2, 1962, at A15 (reporting death of David Lee Corbin). The
Times reported David Corbin's death as follows:
Mr. Corbin was a leading specialist in aviation law and was a partner in the firm
of Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens of 80 Broad Street.
Mr. Corbin, 51, had been on a business trip. He was the secretary and director of
United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., of 110 William-Street.
Mr. Corbin lived with his family at Pheasant Lane, Greenwich, Conn. He was a
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commuting almost weekly to Los Angeles, where he was in charge of a suit
by 30 or 40 plaintiffs against United and the U.S.A. (the Las Vegas
collision). David was the best man and the soundest and most effective
lawyer, that I have ever known. But my family and my case work for the
Pkt. Supp. are keeping me alive. I have revised Vol. 6 into 2 volumes, with
much rewriting on Arbitration. The galley proofs will soon be coming.
Reading and noting all the Contract cases for the last 12 years have kept
me on the front line. I shall be looking for you.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
[Letter includes hand drawn map with directions]
Restatement





I have received Prelim. Draft No. 5 and have given it one reading. It
is in your usual clear style and seems to be an improvement on Restatement
I.
Here in Maine I -have no copy of my own Treatise or of my previous
revisions. My Pocket Supplement, to be published in September, contains
notes on some late cases.
In § 143, it might be well to note that § 142 does not require any
express provision to make the obligation to the third party irrevocable.
The oculist required me to give iip the dilation eye-drop. Since May
18, I have read no reports of decisions.
I return home, 21 Robinwood Road, Hamden 17, Conn. on Sept 8. I
shall be 90 in October, very deaf and bad ision.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur L. Corbin
graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School.
He is survived by his widow, Margaret; two sons, David and Philip, and a daughter,
Margaret, his father, Arthur, and two brothers, Herbert and Arthur, Jr.
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Glaucoma has just caught the reading spot in my remaining eye; but I
must write this letter. Your name is on the G.O.P. list of professors for
Goldwater. I too expect to vote for him, even though his campaign has
been ineffective and his inept use of the English language has made him
vulnerable to attack and misrepresentation. He is the more honest of the
candidates and the less likely to get us into a nuclear war. Also, he is
himself more sympathetic with the Negro than is Johnson.
My vote next week will be my 18th vote in a presidential election. In
every case I have had firm convictions and a definite choice. But since
joining the Yale faculty in 1903 I have never taken part in a political
campaign. This is because I concentrated on the building up of the Yale
Law School and upon the understanding and improvement of the "law"
as a part of the evolutionary process of life.
There are 3 articles in the Readers Digest for Sept., Oct., and November
that ought to elect Goldwater but of course will have little effect: September
article by a Cuban on the Bay of Pigs-the most disgraceful episode in
American history. 44 October article from McArthur's account on the Korean
War-an equally disgraceful and injurious episode.4" The November article
by Nixon, well written, restrained, verifiable in every respect except as to
Nixon's personal conversations with Castro and Kennedy. 46
My 90th anniversary-a most undesired one-came and went. Altho
deaf and blind and my law work ended, I could not refuse a request of
the editor of the Kansas Law Review, representative of my native State and
my Alma Mater. The article will appear in the December number.47
44. Mario Lazo, Decision for Disaster: At Last the Truth about the Bay of Pigs,
READER'S DIGEST, Sept. 1964, at 241.
45. Douglas MacArthur, No Substitute for Victory, READER'S DIGEST, Oct. 1964, at 263.
46. Richard M. Nixon, Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy, Some Reflections on United
States Foreign Policy, READER'S DIGEST, Nov. 1964, at 281.
47. See Corbin, supra note 14. In this article Corbin articulated his theory as to "rules"
and "certainty" in the law. Surprisingly, it was consistent throughout his lengthy career. The
statement is as follows:
What then is 'the law'? And is there no certainty in 'language'? Are there not rules
of law 'fixed and settled' by which judges as well as other men are bound, expressed
in words that are 'plain and clear' with one true and 'objective' meaning? A long-
time researcher must reply that there are no such 'rules' and no such 'words.'
Nevertheless, the 'law' consists of 'rules,' an increasing multitude of them as time
goes on. They are not to be scorned merely because they are 'tentative working
rules,' growing and changing with the conditions of human life, and with the
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My mind ranges over many of the other 17 presidential elections; I still
"writhe" over many episodes, when the wrong man was elected for bad
reasons. I could not avoid expressing at least this much to you.






Some time ago I sent to you the briefs on appeal in a New Jersey case.
The appellant's counsel, having won his case, has sent to me a copy of the
opinion of the Sup. Ct. of N.J.4 I herewith inclose it for your use.
developing mores of mankind. Without them the world would be a chaotic and
guideless world, with every man acting in accordance with his own vagrant emotion
and desire. Also, a 'rule' is not to be scorned merely because it is supported by one
'authority' and not by another. 'Authorities' vary greatly in merit and wisdom. The
'rules' that they support are often conflicting, and after a longer or shorter time are
always modified or supplanted by later 'authorities.' Therefore, every student, writer,
and judge has a responsibility of his own. He must make a choice among 'authorities,'
among 'rules,' and among interpretations of the words by which a rule is expressed.
The author is not downgrading the 'authority' of his own treatise when he invites
every reader to make a critical study of the sources on which its many 'tentative
working rules' are based. Justice Cardozo, saintly and wise and understanding and
sympathetic, was never able to find a 'solid land of fixed and settled rules' or the
'Paradise of a Justice' that would declare itself, and yet he went from the highest
court in New York to the highest court of the United States. In spite of his 'doubts
and misgivings, hopes and fears,' he had to depend upon his own 'vacillating mind
and conscience.' In every case that a judge decides, he must realize that his decision
and the 'rule' or 'principle' that he adopts and applies to the unique set of facts
before him will constitute one more datum to be added to the multitude of those
that preceded it, on the basis of which students and writers and other judges will
create new rules and principles and doctrines to modify and supplant those that
have served earlier days. What industry, what clarity of mind, and what nobility of
conscience are required in this judicial process!
Id. at 194-95.
48. The slip opinion attached to the letter with a paper clip is noted in the pocket parts
to 4 ARTIruR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING
RULEs OF CONTRACT LAW § 801 (1951), as follows:
This section, at p. 179 (as well as § 793) is cited in Schlanger v. Federal Ins. Co.,
206 A.2d 874, 44 N.J. 17 (1965) where the condition of the bond was that contractor
pay all persons supplying material for the contract. In ordering recovery on the
bond for a materialman, the court noted that intent of the promisee and promisor
is too complex for consideration and not decisive. Taking together the contractor's
promise in the main contract to pay for all materials and the condition of the bond,
there was clearly a promise to pay persons such as the plaintiff, and not merely a
promise of indemnity.
It seems likely that surety bond cases such as this were a primary reason why the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) dropped the distinction between creditor and donee beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d, illus. 12 (1979).
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Altho I must write this without seeing clearly the words written, I wish
to send to you a note that I had earlier prepared to send to you. It may
suggest something in reference to statutes.
I recommend Hammes v. Tucson Newspapers, 324 F. 2d 101 (C.A.9th,
1963); and U.S. v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 373 SW 2d 333, 338
(Tex.Civ.App. 1963). Both are noted in my 1964 Pkt. Supp. to Vol. 4, §
903, p. 195.
Failure to record, as provided by statute, should probably never be held
to invalidate the assignment, or prevent the assignee from having a prior
right as against a second assignee who had actual notice. The statute should
merely protect innocent purchasers for value. Of course, statutory wording
is variable.
I regret that I shall not be able to make a second edition of Vol 4,
incorporating the Pkt. Supp. cases and notes. Good luck to you. I wish




Pocket Supp. § 902, Employers Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 99 N.H. 188





Yes, I am still alive. I received from Hdqrs.-a copy of your last Draft
on Assignment, with their special request for Comment. They had not sent
me the earlier draft or drafts, I am so nearly blind that I cannot read this
as I write it; but I struggled hard and read your Draft until I could read
no longer, I observed no major departures from Rest. I, unless involved in
the U.C. Code (which of course you must follow). I wonder whether you
have encountered any important opposition. My hearing is so bad that (even
with my hearing aid) the reading process is too exhausting. My mind remains
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so clear that I regret my inability to take part in controversies, both
governmental and legal. Last summer, I was able to write to the House of
Rep. Banking Comm. a reasoned disapproval of the Dist. Ct. decision
against the Mfrs-Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
I shall be curious to see what you do with the Statute of Frauds. Of
course, old § 17 should be wholly replaced by the U.C. Code. In view of
that Code and of the English statutory action, as well as the many variations
in the U.S., it is my inclination to omit any attempt by the ALl to generalize,
substituting a mere Resume of the present situation. Doubtless, that would
offend many lawyers.
I hope that I live long enough, with ability to read your Revision of
Chap. 9; but I cannot expect to have that pleasure. Of course, you have
seen the Cornell reprint of my late Sections in my Pocket Supp. for 1964.
4 9
Please note that I personally read every important Contract decision in the
U.S.A. between 1951 and May 18, 1964. The Second edition of Vols. 1, 3,
5, and 6, along with my Pocket Supplement of 1964, brought my opinions
on all 12 volumes down to May 18, 1964. I would have made a second ed.
of Vol 4 also except for my blindness. But the Pocket Supp. contains more
than 300 pages, with full casenotes and some new Sections. My 2d ed. of
Vol 3 has a Supplement of over 300 pages.
You certainly have reason to approve my repeated urgings to Herbert
Goodrich (and Wechsler) that you must not be hurried in your work. [Are
we likely to have reason to regret the death of Judge Goodrich?]50
I have assigned to Yale all my copyrights and Royalties. Rostow and
Kessler welcomed that. I have given to Kessler my only copy of my own
extensive Suggestions on the Revision of Cont. Restatement I.




Kessler and Rostow will control all subsequent additions to and revisions
of my works. It looks to me now as if Lou Pollak will make an excellent
Dean.
Arthur Corbin died in 1967. Robert Braucher did not select any of the
people Corbin suggested as advisors. Braucher turned over the job of
49. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CoRNEL L.Q. 161 (1965).
50. Judge Goodrich died on June 25, 1962. A telegram from Paul A. Wolkin to Robert
Braucher, of that date reads: "I AM SORRY TO INFORM YOU THAT JUDGE GOODRICH
DIED EARLY TODAY." Telegram from Paul A. Wolkin to Robert Braucher (June 25, 1962)
(Robert Braucher Papers, Harvard Law School Library, MS Box 17, Folder 7). Herbert
Wechsler replaced Goodrich as director of the American Law Institute. Corbin seems to be
concerned that Wechseler might pressure Braucher to speed up the preparation of the RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND).
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Reporter to E. Allan Farnsworth in 1971. Begun in 1962, the Restatement
(Second) was finally completed in 1979. The Foreword to the Restatement
(Second) credits Corbin with leaving the restaters "a rich legacy in his
elaborate written notes." 51
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Foreword, at vii (1979).
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